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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MORTGAGE INVESTMENT CO., 
INC. Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
SPENCER W. TOONE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 10311 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
SPENCER W. TOONE 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
The appellant, Spencer W. Toone, appeals from a sum-
mary judgment entered by the Honorable Stewart M. Han-
son, Judge, upon a suit by respondent, Mortgage Invest-
ment Company, claiming monies due it under the terms of a 
uniform real estate contract. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On June 26, 1963, the respondent filed its complaint in 
the District Court, Third Judicial District. The suit was for 
a money judgment under a uniform real estate contract. 
A default judgment was entered and set aside. Subse-
quently, first and second amended complaints were filed 
and on December 1 7, 1963 the appellant's answer to the 
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second amended complaint was filed. Subsequently, dis-
covery was undertaken and on December 1 7, 1964 a pre-
trial order was entered by Judge Hanson, in which he took 
under advisement the respondent's motion for summary 
judgment. On December 22, 1964, the Court entered sum-
mary judgment. From this judgment, the appellant prose-
cutes this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks reversal of the summary judgment 
and trial on the issues. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant submits the following statement of facts. 
The record will be cited as (R-) and the deposition of the 
appellant as (D-). 
The respondent, in its second amended complaint, al-
leged that on December 6, 1962, Northwestern Investment 
Corporation and the appellant executed a uniform real 
estate contract ( R-29) . The appellant further alleged that 
the plaintiff was the assignee of the seller, Northwestern In-
vestment Corporation (R-29). It was additionally alleged 
that the appellant was indebted to the respondent, appar-
ently because of the contract, in the sum of $3,919.32 for 
one payment and $3,676.90 for another. Respondent sought 
$1,287.00 attorney's fees (R-29). A copy of the uniform 
real estate contract was attached as an exhibit to the first 
complaint (R-2). 
The appellant admitted the execution of the contract; 
but denied the assignment and all other allegations ( R-19) · 
The appellant raised as an affirmative defense that the con-
tract he signed was not his obligation but that of a Mr. 0. A. 
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Tatro (R-19). Appellant obtained an order allowing Tatro 
to be joined as a third party ( R-28) . 
At the time of pretrial, the pretrial order framed as an 
additional issue a claim that the respondent knew that the 
appellant was not the true buyer of the property involved 
in the contract and that he was acting as an agent (R-22). 
The only evidence of record, in addition to the pleadings, 
considered by the trial court was the deposition of the ap-
pellant, Spencer W. Toone (R-23). The deposition of the 
appellant recites that he is a rancher and executed the con-
tract with Northwestern Investment Corporation (D-2, 3). 
He testified that he suspected that the appellant might pur-
chase the contract from Northwestern when he executed it 
(D-4) , but did not know of the assignment or purchase 
(D-5) . He testified to executing two contracts for the same 
property on different terms, but did not know why that was 
done (D-12). He testified that he signed the contract as 
the purchaser, but assigned it to 0. A. Tatro who was pres-
ent when the contract was signed (D-9-11). The appel-
lant admitted he had not made any payments under the 
contract (D-6). No inquiry was made concerning any 
knowledge of the respondent that appellant was acting as 
an agent for Tatro, or whether he was in fact acting as an 
agent. No evidence was produced as to the absence of a 
novation or of any notice having been given to the appel-
lant of the claimed assignment from Northwestern to Mort-
gage Investment Company. 
Based on the above evidence, it is submitted the trial 





THE RECORD FAILS TO SHOW THAT APPELLANT HAD 
ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE CLAIMED ASSIGN~vfENT 
BETWEEN THE SELLER AND RESPONDENT AND THERE-
FORE FAILS TO PROVE APPELLANT'S DUTY TO PAY 
RESPONDENT. 
It is well settled that on appeal from a summary judg-
ment the facts will be viewed most favorable to the loser 
' Frederick May & Co., Inc. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 
P.2d 266, and judgment sustained only if, from the evidence 
considered, it appears that there is no material dispute of 
fact as to any of the issues. When so viewed the winner is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law if he should other-
wise prevail. Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers Co-op, 
11 Utah 2d 353, 359 P.2d 18; Christensen v. Financial 
Service Co., 14 Utah 2d 101, 377 P.2d 1010. If the plead-
ing of a party is not traversed by actual evidence to the con-
trary, a factual dispute exists for the jury's determination. 
Christensen v. Financial Service Co., supra. 
The evidence in this case clearly shows that there is a 
definite factual dispute as to whether the appellant was ever 
notified of the alleged assignment from Northwestern to 
the respondent. The appellant in his deposition expressly 
denied knowing anything about the alleged assignment 
(D-7). The only indication of knowledge was a men· 
suspicion at the time of execution that the respondent might 
purchase a contract from Northwestern (D-4). Nowhere 
does the record show the date of the alleged assignment 
or show any notice of assignment having been given to the 
appellant. 
It is well settled that before a party is bound to make con-
tract payments to an assignee of a seller, he must have notice 
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of the assignment. Thus, in 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assignments, 
~ 96, it is stated: 
"***It has been said that a debtor has the right to deal 
with his creditor until he has actual notice of an assign-
ment of the debt." · 
* * * 
"The courts generally are agreed that notice to the 
debtor of an assignment is necessary in order to charge 
the debtor with the duty of payment to the assignee, 
* * *" 
Williston, Contracts, 3rd Ed.,§ 433, comments: 
"The debtor should not be prejudiced by an assignment 
of which he has no notice. Accordingly, 'while notice 
to an obligor is not essential to the validity of an assign-
ment as between an assignor and an assignee, until 
such notice has been given, the obligor may continue to 
regard the assignor as the owner of the interest or thing 
assigned, whether it be a leasehold; a contract to pay 
rent; a lien or charge against property; or otherwise; 
the assignor remains in privity with the obligor insofar 
as the performance of obligations by the latter is re-
quired under the instrument assigned.' " 
This Court has recognized the general rule in Van Dyke's 
Food Store v. Ind. Coal & Coke Co., 84 Utah 95, 34 P.2d 
706 ( 1934) where the Court observed in an assignment 
dispute: 
"It is elementary that, in the absence of such notice, 
defendant is not liable to plaintiff." 
See also Nanny v. H. E. Pogue Distillery Co., 56 C.A.2d 
817, 133 P.2d 686; Skivington v. Studer Tractor & Equip. 
Co., 350 P.2d 729 (Wyo.). 
Under the above rules and the evidence of this case, it is 
clear that the question of the sufficiency of notice is not 
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without dispute. Further, since the appellant has made 
other allegations that he was a mere agent, and that a third 
party was involved which raises a possible novation, it is 
apparent that the question of notice and the sufficiency of 
notice raise issues warranting further exploration. Mere 
imputed notice is not favored. 6 Am. Jur. 2d, Assignments, 
§ 99. 
Further, the pleadings show that the appellant denied 
the assignment. This placed the burden of proof upon the 
respondent to prove that an assignment was made prior to 
the commencement of the action and that notice of the 
assignment was given to the appellant. 6 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Assignments, § 136, observes: 
"Unless the defendants admit the assignment under 
which the plaintiff claims, it is incumbent upon the 
plaintiff to prove a valid assignment in order to show 
that he has a cause of action.***" 
* * * 
"As between an assignee and the debtor, the burden of 
proving that the debtor has received actual or con-
structive notice of the assignment so as to shift his 
responsibility for performance of his obligations from 
the assignor to the assignee, rests upon the assignee." 
It is apparent that the record in this case does not show 
the evidence to have been so conclusive and of such posture 
as to warrant summary judgment. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT WHERE APPELLANT CONTENDED THAT THE 
RESPONDENT WAS AWARE THAT APPELLANT WAS ACT-
ING ONLY ON BEHALF OF A THIRD PERSON IN MAKING 
THE PURCHASE. 
It is well settled that a person acting as an agent on behalf 
of someone else, who discloses his agency, is not liable under 
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a contract made on behalf of the principal. 3 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Agency, ~ 294, notes: 
"If a contract is made with a known agent acting within 
the scope of his authority for a disclosed principal, the 
contract is that of the principal alone and the agent 
cannot be held liable thereon, unless credit has been 
given expressly and exclusively to the agent and it 
appears that it was clearly his intention to assume the 
obligation as a personal liability and that he has been 
informed that credit has been extended to him alone." 
The Restatement of Agency 2d, ~ 320, acknowledges the 
rule: 
"Unless otherwise agreed, a person making or purport-
ing to make a contract with another as agent for a dis-
closed principal does not become a party to the con-
tract.'' 
This Court acknowledged the above rule in State ex rel 
Public Welfare Commission v. Bonnett, 114 Utah 546. 201 
P.2d 939 ( 1949). 
The rule is applicable to the instant case since the pre-
trial order recites as an issue the claim that the respondent 
and the seller were aware that the appellant was merely 
acting on behalf of a third person. No evidence appears of 
r<"cord that dispells this contention of the appellant. The 
evidence is most sketchy concerning what was actually 
intended at the time the appellant executed the contract, 
which is the subject of the instant action. The full factual 
circumstances surrounding the execution of the subject con-
tract, and another contract for the same property, do not 
clearly appear. Further, there may have been a contempo-
raneous oral agreement between the appellant, Northwest-
ern, Tatro and the respondent that Tatro would assume all 
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obligations.* This, of course, would avoid any contention 
that the parole evidence rule is somehow applicable so as to 
bar proof of any other arrangement. Corbin, Contracts, 
§ 584; Restatement of Contracts, § 240. This being so, it is 
apparent that the trial court acted hastily in granting sum-
mary judgment and the case should be remanded for trial 
to allow the appellant to show the full circumstances sur-
roundin,g the transaction. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ACTED IMPROPERLY IN GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER 
THE APPELLANT'S CONTENTION OF NOVATION AND 
ALLOW EVIDENCE CONCERNING FACTS WHICH WOULD 
SUPPORT NOVATION. 
The record in the instant case discloses that the appellant 
contends that by virtue of the assignment of the contract by 
him to Tatro that he is no longer obligated under the con-
tract. This, of course, could only be so if the seller, North-
western, or its assignee agreed to look to the assignee of the 
appellant. Kennedy v. Griffith, 98 Utah 183, 95 P.2d 752 
( 1939). If this did occur, the appellant would not be obli-
gated. If at the time of contract there was an oral con-
temporaneous agreement to relieve appellant on the con-
tract upon his assignment to Tatro, a novation would have 
occurred on assignment. 39 Am. J ur., N ovation, § 4; Davis 
v. Kemp, 3 Utah 2d 16, 277 P.2d 816. 
The claim of novation is clear from the nature of the pre-
trial order and appellant's contention. The record does not 
* It is well recognized that many transactions concerning real estate invol\'e 
the use of nominees. Friedman, Contracts & Conveyances of Real Property. 
Section 2.2, 2nd Ed., 1963: 
"As heretofore mentioned, it is familiar practice in real estate transactions 
to use a nominee (sometimes called a 'dummy' or 'straw man') instead ol 
the real party in interest, for one or more of the following purposes: to 
sign a contract of sale, as purchaser; to take title; execute mortgage 
instruments. There are many other uses for nominees, many of which art 
legitimate." 
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factually dispell the contention that a novation actually 
occurred. Rather, there are several inferences that support 
a novation: ( 1) the apparent understanding of appellant 
that he was a mere nominee and would not be liable on 
assignment; ( 2) the fact that the respondent was appar-
ently involved along with Tatro in the original negotiation; 
and ( 3) the fact that two contracts were executed. The 
latter fact itself could be the basis for a novation and pre-
clude an action on the instant contract. 39 Am. J ur., Nova-
tion, § 14. 
It is submitted this Court should afford appellant the 
right to have the factual basis of his claims determined. The 
record, as it now exists, is at best sketchy and obscure. 'The 
appropriate remedy is to reverse and allow a full airing of 
the facts. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment is a harsh remedy. Its function is to 
expedite cases where there is no factual dispute between the 
parties and where further proceedings would present no 
basis which would alter the result. It is apparent that in the 
instant case the facts surrounding several of the legal issues 
raised by the appellant were not explored. The trial court's 
summary action, based on the sketchy record, makes it ob-
vious that summary judgment was inappropriate. There 
are factual matters which still require exploration. This 
Court should reverse and allow the appellant an oppor-
tunity to have his case determined at trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM J. CA YIAS 
405 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
